Special Issue on the Congo Crisis

Documentary: The Yugoslav Speech Through Which the Neutrals Warned Mr. Hammarsksjold, See Page 3

I. F. Stone's Weekly

VOL. VIII, NO. 33 SEPTEMBER 19, 1960 WASHINGTON, D. C. 15 CENTS

The Calculations Behind the Chaos

United Nations, N.Y., Sept. 14

Unlike Humpty Dumpty, M. Lumumba seems to have succeeded in putting himself together again. As of this early morning moment, on the eve of what promises to be a crucial session of the UN Security Council, it appears to be poor Mr. Hammarskjold who has suffered a great fall. The future of the Secretary General has been put in question by the savage personal attack launched from the Baltika by Mr. Khrushchov in his replies to questions put by the London *Daily Express*, and by Nkrumah's threat to withdraw Ghana's troops from the UN command in the Congo unless Mr. Hammarskjold reversed his policy and freed the radio stations and airports of that country for use by the Lumumba government. Ghana's voice was the voice of the uncommitted Africans, and in response to it the UN has backed down. The African bloc has won its first great victory, and Mr. Hammarskjold must depend upon it to protect him from Mr. Khrushchov if the latter really wants his head.

Lumumba the One National Leader

However poor an opinion the other African States may have of the mercurial and tempestuous M. Lumumba, he is the Congo's one more-than-tribal national leader. As grateful as they may be to Mr. Hammarskjold, there is one issue on which they stand with the former and oppose the latter, and that is the preservation of Congolese unity. Not that there is anything sacred about the boundaries which the predatory Belgians imposed three quarters of a century ago in this the dark heart of darkest Africa, or that other boundaries based on tribal or linguistic differences might not be more rational, but because the Africans could not stand aside and allow Belgian intrigue with Western aid to detach its richest portions in Katanga and Kasai for a new kind of colonial empire, leaving the rest in hopeless poverty for a long time to come.

The Congolese crisis has its roots in the double strategy of Belgium. The guiding motto of Brussels during its 80 years of overlordship was *"pas d'élites, pas d'ennuis"* (no elite, no troubles) which might be freely translated as, "if you don't educate them, they won't know enough to bother you about their rights." The story of Belgium's failure to educate the Congolese or to prepare them for self-government is by now too well known to require repetition here. When inevitable changes were signalled by the Leopoldville riots of January, 1959, precipitated by police attack on an independence rally, Belgium swung to the corollary of its basic policy and (like the Dutch in Indonesia) figured that their best bet for continued influence and control was to grant independence so abruptly and with so little preparation that native ineptitude would be easily proven and Belgian control welcomed. In this perspective the *Force Publique* mutiny which gave the Belgians an excuse to move back in within a few days of independence may have been unforeseen but something like this was bound to happen and the Belgians counted on it, particularly to retain control of Katanga where the bulk of the Congo's mineral riches lie. There they had at hand a party formed under their influence (see box on this page) and with a native leader—Moise Tshombe—ready to do their bidding. Katanga was to become the center of a new loosely linked Congolese federation or an independent State; in either case, the Belgian-British-American capital in the Katanga mines could go on with their immensely profitable enterprise without letting its fruits be garnered by higher taxation to modernize the rest of the Congo, or endangered by the newest of bogies —a Congolese Castro.

This program required subtle footwork. When M. Lumumba appealed to the United States for military aid to stop the Belgian reoccupation, his request had to be rejected. The U.S. could not afford to enter upon a direct frontal conflict with its NATO ally. When M. Lumumba turned to the United Nations for military aid, the U.S. could not oppose this move since the alternatives were his threat to invoke the help of the Bandung powers or, worse, the intervention of the Soviet Union. The U.S. had to maneuver between various risks—that of a Soviet foothold in Africa, that of offending the emerging African States by taking sides only with Belgian colonialism, and that of embittering Belgium as England and France had been embittered by our similar unwillingness to let them reoccupy the Suez. In the last analysis, Belgium could not leave NATO but the African States could swing toward the Soviet bloc. Mr. Hammarskjold was able to utilize the dynamics of the situation to get both great Powers to acquiesce in swift action to rush military and technical aid to the foundering Congolese state.

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Key to the Confusion in the Congo

"The CONAKAT (Confederation des Associations du Katanga) is a party representing the bulk of the tribes native to Katanga, but under very strong white influence. The CONAKAT was originally a tribal association, but was transformed into a political party in no small measure as a result of intervention by white colons with the assistance of many officials of Union Miniere and some of the administration. . . . Under white influence, the CONAKAT has also developed separatist tendencies, and has been suspected of the intention to participate in a white sponsored coup d'etat to create a separate Katanga state. Its leader is Moise Tshombe."

—House Foreign Affairs Committee: Staff Memorandum on the Republic of the Congo, Aug. 24, p. 45.

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But if one goes back and restudies the five Security Council sessions so far held on the Congo question, it soon appears that the two big Powers and the African bloc were not as much in accord as their votes on the key resolutions. The Congolese and the Africans generally regarded the Security Council's first resolution as designed in the words of the former "to protect the national territory against acts of aggression posed by Belgian troops," while the Western powers regarded it as a move designed to help the new State restore law and order. The resolution of July 13-14 said nothing of aggression, put no deadline on its request that Belgium withdraw its troops, and authorized the Secretary General to provide the Congo "with such military assistance as may be necessary until, through the efforts of the Congolese government, with the technical assistance of the UN, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks." This was the best that could be achieved as a common denominator of action amid such diverse forces.

Danger Lurked in the Ambiguities

But what first appeared merely to be tactful but innocuous ambiguities soon proved their potency. The Belgians were enabled to delay their withdrawal, on the claim that they too were only interested in upholding law and order, and were ready to withdraw gradually as the UN troops took over their policing duties. In the meantime, the Belgians used their military presence to encourage secessionism, especially in the Katanga, and to solidify Tshombe's regime with military, financial and technical advisers. While the rest of the Congo was in chaos, with panic stricken Belgians pulling out, the mining enterprises of the Katanga continued to operate with little disturbance. This detachment of the Congo's richest province was accompanied by a press campaign in the West designed to undermine the Central Government of M. Lumumba as a Communist conspiracy; this reached a new high of mendacity when the Hearst *New York Journal-American* July 21 dreamed up a whole convoy of Polish ships carrying weapons with Polish and Ukrainian volunteers for M. Lumumba.

The second rift that soon appeared between the West and the African states was over the question of what constitutes interference in the internal affairs of the Congo. As early as August 8, we find Mr. Lodge telling the Security Council, "we must reinforce the Secretary General's view that the United Nations cannot be drawn into the political struggle between Prime Minister Lumumba and Provincial President Tshombe." This view was at once challenged by the moderate and statesmanlike Mongi Slim of Tunisia who refused to accept the view that this was an internal matter in which the UN could not interfere. Belgium had set August 6 for the withdrawal of its troops from Katanga. "But it was then," M. Slim declared, "that a new element emerged. It became obvious in fact that forces organized by the provincial Governor among the population of Katanga had determined to oppose, by the use of arms, the landing of UN troops. These forces of Katanga seemed to be well armed and to be organized by Belgian officers forming part of the Belgian police forces." M. Slim charged that Belgium was itself responsible for this resistance to the UN command and added that this "is even more obvious when we stress the presence of Belgian advisers all around the provincial government of Katanga, and especially at all echelons of the public and security forces of the region. In point of fact, the head of the Cabinet of the [Belgian] Prime Minister was the adviser to the head of the provincial government of Katanga."*

One Possible Clue to Belgian Strategy

"Where the door to independence is ajar and the need for massed political strength is gone, particularist tendencies are encouraged. . . . The decision of the Belgian government abruptly to grant independence had the immediate effect of accentuating . . . secessionist tendencies in the Congolese body politic. Premature granting of independence—before an alternative elite and machinery of effective government have been formed—has potential as a 'divide and rule' strategy. Acceptance of this principle may, in fact, have motivated the Belgian government to make this decision."

—Prof. Henry L. Bretton, University of Michigan, in a paper prepared for an International Political Science Association round table at Ann Arbor, Sept. 15.

*** M. D'Aspremont Lynden, who has since been appointed Minister of African Affairs in the Belgian Cabinet. See L'Express for September 8 which reported that this appointment, which was followed by a sharp rise in Union Miniere stock, had been criticized almost unanimously by the Belgian press. L'Express said it foreshadowed a hostile Congolese policy and that "at certain windows of the capital, portraits of 'the honest M. Kasavubu' have made their appearance."**

Tshombe's Secession Movement Pictured As Belgian Farce by U.S. Reporter

"Until July this year, Katanga was a name known only to the buffs of the Stock Exchange. Union Miniere du Haut Katanga had been as safe as A.T.&T. and gold for years. It was natural—and correct—that the Katanga bid for secession from the troubled state of Congo should be associated with the tiny area's rich mining interests.

"One can go further. For perhaps the most significant fact about Katanga nationalism, secessionism, independentism and autonomy-in-confederationism is that these articles of faith are a predominantly Belgian doctrine . . . it would appear there are no strong feelings about secession, except among a few Katangese politicians—and, of course, among Belgians in Katanga.

"When Hammarskjold arrived at Elizabethville [capital of Katanga] airport, the people shouting 'Long live Katanga! Down with the United Nations!' were exclusively Belgian. Only six Africans were present in a crowd of over one hundred people. Only one shouted. He cried 'Down with confederation! Long live a united Congo!' He was arrested on the spot—by a Belgian major—and hustled off to the city jail. He happened to be a member of the local legislature. . . .

". . . Belgium's most unforgivable acts were: firstly, to goad Tshombe, who never understood what an international heretic he was becoming, into defying the United Nations . . . secondly, to encourage his movement to the point of writing his 'independence' constitution . . . by training his para-military police (an army in all but name) . . . and drafting the 'nine conditions' ultimatum to UN regarding acceptance of UN forces. . . .

"It was obvious, all along, that Belgian troops (including the Belgian officers in Tshombe's private army) would not dare fire on UN. Yet Belgium encouraged Tshombe to launch his famous appeal to Katangese chiefs to prepare the poison for the arrows. . . ."

—Russell Howe, in the Washington Post, Sept. 9.

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Non-Intervention Became Intervention

To the Africans, M. Hammarskjold's policy of non-intervention thus began to seem another form of intervention. In the meantime, while the West was carrying on this farce behind the scenes the Russians were moving outside the framework of the UN to make M. Lumumba beholden to them. The whole idea of UN intervention was to keep the two big powers out of direct involvement in the Congolese crisis, an idea which was warmly supported by the Africans. The Soviets began to put air transport at the disposal of M. Lumumba for the movement of his troops. Here were the seeds of additional trouble. In a note of September 5, the Secretary General asked the Soviet Union "about the nationality and status of the crews of the troop transporting planes, which presumably are now under the control of the Congo Government," adding "the significance of this information will be appreciated in view of the precedent that may be created." To this the Soviets replied on November 10 with a note which was a challenge to the whole UN operation, saying that the resolution of the Security Council "does not restrict, nor can it restrict, the right of the Government of the sovereign Republic of the Congo to request assistance from the Governments of other countries, apart from the United Nations, and to receive such assistance. Nor does it give United Nations officials any right to control the assistance rendered to the Republic of the Congo by any State at the request of the Congolese government." But how seal the Congo dispute off from direct intervention by the two big Powers if one of them began to give direct assistance outside the framework of the UN operation? Mr. Hammarskjold referred to this in his report to the Security Council the night of September 9 when he spoke of "aggravating elements introduced into the picture by inter-

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Not So Neutral

"Mr. Hammarskjold wants more authority to intervene directly in internal Congolese affairs for two reasons, one stated and the other private. The main reason is that of preserving law and order in the country. The other reason, which the formally neutral Mr. Hammarskjold doesn't talk about, is that of preventing Russia and its satellites from grabbing control of first the Congo and then the rest of Central Africa.

"While the Security Council debates whether he should be given authority to disarm the Congolese army, Mr. Hammarskjold has already begun doing so. . . . Although no one has formally given the UN command in the Congo authority over Congolese troops, it appears to have gained this control by the device of paying the Congolese troops for the first time in weeks. This step apparently helped the UN to get Congolese Army officers to declare a truce in their operations against President Moise Tshombe's secessionist Katanga province.

"Mr. Hammarskjold has also thrown off his previous insistence on following the letter of the law. He told the Security Council the seriousness of the Congo crisis outweighs the need for a strict interpretation of legalisms."

—Wall St. Journal, from Washington, Sept. 12.

Yugoslav Delegate First Voices Neutral Discontent With UN's Role In the Congo

"We have before us the question of the character and extent of outside interference in the Republic of the Congo and of certain shortcomings demonstrated by the practices of the Command of the UN forces. . . .

"The aggression of the Belgian troops . . . was . . . the basic cause of the entire negative course of events. . . . On 13 July 1960 . . . the [Security] Council called upon the government of Belgium to withdraw its troops. . . . On 22 July the Council again had to request . . . withdrawal as soon as possible. . . .

"All this notwithstanding, the Council found itself in the position of having to call once again, on 9 August, upon the government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the entire territory of the Congo, more precisely from the Province of Katanga and its military bases. In spite of all this, we heard on 24 August once again reassurances on the subject of the withdrawal of the Belgian troops, which was being brought into effect with incessant postponements and various unfounded difficulties. . . . Not even today are we precisely informed whether or not the withdrawal of Belgian troops has been completely effected. . . .

"The continued stationing of Belgian troops in some areas had certain additional and very negative political consequences, inevitably encouraging and supporting weak secessionist currents . . . even the evacuation of the greatest part, or, for that matter, let us say, of all the Belgian armed forces did not completely end the outside interference in the internal affairs of the Congo. . . . The deliveries of armaments to the secessionist ringleaders, Tshombe and Kalonji, foreign military personnel in the units of their military or police forces . . . all this is not and cannot be in conformity with the request of the Security Council. . . .

"Now I turn to the practices of the Command of the UN forces. . . . Some reluctance, well know to all of us, to send the UN troops into the Province of Katanga during the very beginning of the UN action in the Republic of the Congo was the first serious symptom of possible friction. . . . Because of a certain interpretation of non-interference . . . the Command of the UN forces has not found sufficient necessary and indispensable ways of preventing military and other outside help from being given to the secessionist ringleaders. . . . All military equipment put at the disposal of these people should be confiscated. . . . Foreign personnel should be removed from each and every local formation. . . .

"'In all this, appropriate cooperation with the Central Government, which is legally entitled to exercise its authority in the integral whole of the Congo, is necessary. Lack of resolution in this respect was and is infringing upon the legal rights of the Central Government. . . .

"I assume that all of us here are in complete agreement that it is necessary to solve the controversy between the Republic of the Congo and the UN Command concerning control over the airports and over the seizing and closing down of the Leopoldville radio station by the Command. To what extent this is intolerable can be illustrated by the fact that the Commander of the Congolese national security forces in person could not . . . land at the Leopoldville airport. It is understandable that such measures, not being taken with the concurrence of the Government, and preventing the discharge of its normal functions, must provoke conflict. . . . The same clearly applied to the essential right of the Government to use its transport and radio facilities. . . .

"Further developments in such a direction could bring almost unbearable relations between the Government and the UN Command which could result in orientation of the Government to seek aid from friendly countries. . . . It is not difficult to foresee what consequences this could have for the United Nations."

—Mr. Vidic, Yugoslavia, in the Security Council Sept. 9.

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Mr. Hammarskjold's Future in Doubt Unless He Can Again Rally Africans

(*Continued from Page Three*)

ference from the outside." He said that while the Soviet actions, unlike the continued shipment by the Belgians of munitions to Katanga, were not directly in violation of Security Council resolutions, "I think it should be recognized that this is no longer a question of form and legal justification but a question of very hard realities." The planes, though piloted by civilians as the Russians claimed, constituted military aid since M. Lumumba was using them to ferry troops.

Belgium's New Hope: Kasavubu

The picture is still murky. Much remains to be known. But Mr. Hammarskjold's answer to the furnishing of Soviet transport seems to have been UN seizure of control at the airports. Mr. Hammarskjold told the Security Council the night of September 9 that the airports were closed "for all but United Nations operations, so as to be certain that the United Nations would be able to operate in fulfilment of its mandate, whatever happened." With the closing of the airports, the UN command also took over the radio stations, presumably to prevent aggravation of the crisis which arose on September 5 when the President, M. Kasavubu, Belgium's new black hope, and the Prime Minister, M. Lumumba, tried to fire each other. But in taking over the means of communication, the UN was in effect taking over the Congo. If the UN had ended the secessionist movement in Katanga and made clear that it was preserving the integrity of the Congolese state, a UN protectorate for several years might have been palatable to the Africans; the Congo obviously is not yet ready for self-government. But to take over the Central Government when Belgian mining interests and their puppet were in effective control of Katanga was a form of intervention the African states could not accept. There followed a protest by Yugoslavia, which in this was speaking for the neutrals (see box bottom of p. 3) and the threat by Nkrumah to withdraw the troops of Ghana from the UN forces. Mr. Hammarskjold had to back down, releasing the radio and the airports, while the parliament in Leopoldville by supporting M. Lumumba frustrated Belgian hopes of establishing a new government headed by M. Kasavubu which would be willing to work in loose confederation with their man, Tshombe.

What the Security Council is about to do at this writing, what the immediate consequences will be for Mr. Hammarskjold and the UN, cannot be told until next week. But it would be a pity for the African states and for the world if the UN were to be torn apart over the Congolese issue and if so able and devoted an international public servant as Mr. Hammarskjold were to lose his post. For the great Powers, the UN is a sideshow, but for the newly emerging nations it is their one hope. It would be tragic if great power rivalry in the Congo were to swamp the UN, for the job it has done there so far has after all frustrated Belgian hopes of Congolese collapse, provided a funnel for desperately needed technical and financial aid, and created a channel through which peaceful settlement with full justice to Congolese aspirations is still possible. We hope.

The Congo Seems to Be Divisible Even If "Freedom" Isn't

"Asked if the Congo would be 'worth going through another Korea,' the Governor answered: "I think freedom is indivisible. . . . We have got to be ready to fight for it whether it is in Korea or Hungary or Congo. . . . We have got to be ready to protect the forces of freedom."

—New York Times report Sept. 5 on Governor Rockefeller's appearance on ABC's Open Hearing Sept. 4.

"But at the moment the essential problem which determines the whole future of the Congo is that of Katanga. Since the Round Table conference held last January in Brussels, M. Lumumba has denounced the maneuvers of politicians in Katanga who, under the pretext of preserving the autonomy of the province, demand its detachment from the Congo. This separatist movement, which culminated 11 days after the grant of independence, in M. Tshombe's proclaiming the independence of Katanga and its economic union with Belgium, was stimulated by financial circles in Brussels associated with those of British Rhodesia and of certain American interests like the Rockefeller group which has influential shares in Katanga."

—Pierre Stibbe in France-Observateur, July 14.

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Second class postage paid at Washington, D. C.

I. F. Stone's Weekly. Entered as Second Class Matter at Washington, D. C., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Post-dated Mondays but published every Thursday except the last two Thursdays of August and December at 5618 Nebraska Ave., N. W., Washington 15, D. C. An independent weekly published and edited by I. F. Stone: Circulation Manager, Esther M. Stone. Subscription: $5 in the U. S.: $6 in Canada: $10 elsewhere. Air Mail rates: $15 to Europe: $20 to Israel, Asia and Africa

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